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Guard Sets for Onion Routing
Abstract: “Entry” guards protect the Tor onion rout-
ing system from variants of the “predecessor” attack,
that would allow an adversary with control of a frac-
tion of routers to eventually de-anonymize some users.
Research has however shown the three guard scheme
has drawbacks and Dingledine et al. proposed in 2014
for each user to have a single long-term guard. We first
show that such a guard selection strategy would be opti-
mal if the Tor network was failure-free and static. How-
ever under realistic failure conditions the one guard pro-
posal still suffers from the classic fingerprinting attacks,
uniquely identifying users. Furthermore, under dynamic
network conditions using single guards offer smaller
anonymity sets to users of fresh guards. We propose
and analyze an alternative guard selection scheme by
way of grouping guards together to form shared guard
sets. We compare the security and performance of guard
sets with the three guard scheme and the one guard
proposal. We show guard sets do provide increased re-
sistance to a number of attacks, while foreseeing no sig-
nificant degradation in performance or bandwidth uti-
lization.
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Introduction
Tor [DMS04] is one of the most popular low-latency
distributed anonymity networks [Cha81]. Volunteer re-
lays route encrypted network traffic to a desired desti-
nation, providing users with anonymity. Tor employs
three layers of relays – guards, middle, and exit re-
lays – to provide anonymity to user circuits by obscur-
ing the correspondence between initiators of an internet
connection and the services they access. A body of re-
search [Din14, DS08, ØS06, WALS04] studies how these
relays should be selected in order to minimize user ex-
posure to de-anonymization risks. The choice of the cir-
cuit guard is crucial both for security and performance.
Tor’s (pre-2015) design saw each user choose a small set
of guards and use three of them for extended periods of
Jamie Hayes: UCL, E-mail: j.hayes@cs.ucl.ac.uk
George Danezis: UCL, E-mail: g.danezis@ucl.ac.uk
time; post-2015 Tor’s default behaviour is for each user
to choose a single guard from a set of high-availability
high-bandwidth relays and use it for every circuit for up
to nine months.
Security. Both Tor’s three guard design [Pro15] and the
proposed single guard [DKMH14] designs are not with-
out controversy. The choice of guard selection strategy
impacts on the susceptibility of an onion routing system
to three attacks:
Direct Observation. A corrupt guard node can, with
the help of a small set of corrupt exit relays, com-
promise the anonymity of a user. A compromise,
in the context of this attack, means that the guard
will be able to directly observe at least one circuit
from a particular user. The use of relatively stable
guards therefore aims to limit the number of users
that may fall foul of such an attack over time, by
limiting the users exposed to the direct observation
of corrupt relays.
Guard Fingerprinting. A number of at-
tacks [WALS04, BDMT07, DS04] aim to identify
the set of guards used by a user. The set of such
guards acts as a fingerprint for the user and in
case it is unique it may be used to track and de-
anonymize a user’s action within the Tor network.
The three guard design was susceptible to this
attack, since each user chooses a different set of
guards, the combination is likely to be unique. The
single guard design is less susceptible to this attack
(but not entirely, as we discuss in Section 5.1).
Statistical Disclosure Attacks. Even if the identity
of the guards does not in itself uniquely determine
the user, a bigger possible set of users is preferable
to a smaller set of users [DS04, DKMH14], as those
act as an anonymity set. In case a guard, or set of
guards, are only used by a small number of users, it
is possible to link their patterns of actions to long
term identifiers, and degrade the anonymity they
enjoy through disclosure attacks. We examine in
Section 5.1 how both the three guard, and the newer
single guard proposals exhibit variants of this flaw.
The current three guard selection policy has been
shown to provide less security than was originally
thought [Din13, EBA+12], and with that in mind the
proposal of moving from three to one guard has been
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formulated, which solves some but not all security prob-
lems [DKMH14]. In terms of direct observation a single
guard leads to a user having all their circuits potentially
compromised. Given the very conservative definition of
compromise this is not significantly worse than in the
case of using three guards, where some circuit would be
quickly compromised even by a single corrupt guard in
the set. In terms of fingerprinting, a single guard should
no more identify a user to the same extent as three
guards. However, users of smaller or newer guards en-
joy a smaller “anonymity set” than users of larger or
older guards. In this context the main contributions of
this work are:
1. To present a design for “guard sets”, sets of relays
providing a certain amount of bandwidth, that are
used – as a group – by multiple users. We show the
scheme provides near optimal spread of load while
protecting against attacks that the current entry
guard schemes are susceptible to.
2. We design an algorithm based on a binary tree
structure to automate the assignment of guards to
guard sets and to users, while taking into account
the dynamic conditions of the real Tor network
where routers join and leave continuously.
This is work intended as a first examination of guard
sets, and the security and performance analyses we
provide leave important questions whose answers may
require fundamentally different algorithms. Similarly
many practical questions will need to be answered in
order for any guard set approach to be deployable.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In
section 2 we introduce guard sets and explain the threat
model we will work under. In section 3 we develop the
guard set scheme and introduce a binary tree based al-
gorithm for matching users to guard sets. Section 4 in-
troduces the security metric by which we will measure
the success of our proposal against other schemes. We
evaluate the performance and security properties of our
proposal in section 5. Finally, we conclude and discuss
open issues in section 6.
Tor Guards & Guard Sets
Guards are relays that are fast and stable compared to
other relays in the Tor network. More precisely, a relay
has traditionally (pre-2014) been assigned a guard flag
if the following requirements are met:
1. The relay must have been online longer than 12.5%
of relays, or for 8 days.
2. The relay must advertise at least the median band-
width in the network, or 250KB/s.
3. The relay needs to have at least the median
weighted fractional uptime (WFU) of relays in the
network, or 98% WFU. The WFU metric measures
the fraction of uptime of a relay in the past. WFU
values are discounted by factor 0.95 every 12 hours
including the current uptime session.
The one guard proposal (post-2014) imposes similar
requirements but increases the bandwidth threshold
250KB/s to 2MB/s.
Performance. Under the three guard selection policy
clients rotate their guard every 30 days - 60 days. This
serves both security and performance purposes. If clients
never rotate guards then these relays accumulate more
and more users and are under a heavier load compared
with guards that are new to the network and have not
had the opportunity to accumulate users. Conversely,
new guard relays, that have only recently been assigned
a guard flag, are under-utilized; the bandwidth weights
allocate a large fraction of the relay’s bandwidth for
use as a guard, but only few clients have rotated to
this new guard. Increasing the guard rotation period
makes this worse: clients rotate guards less frequently,
and new guards acquire users at a slower rate. Rotating
guard relays frequently spreads the load on bandwidth
efficiently, but also leads to a faster rate of compromise
as [DKMH14, EBA+12] note – leading to a decision to
favor guard stability over load balancing.
The one guard solution relies on using new guards as
“fractional” guards where their available bandwidth is
used as middle and exit nodes when it is under-utilized
initially. This ensures efficient use of bandwidth but
does not increase the anonymity set behind a newer
guard. Ideally we would like new guards to be well popu-
lated and used as soon as they are assigned a guard flag
– a key feature of the proposed “guard set” mechanism.
Threat Model. Like the Tor system itself, we consider
an adversary that may control directly, or observe, a
fixed fraction of the Tor routing infrastructure.
Due to the time and bandwidth costs for becoming a
guard relay we do not consider the attack where an ad-
versary can leave and re-join the network whenever they
wish – as this will lead to their guard status being lost.
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Fig. 1. An example of guard sets consisting of seven guards and fifteen users. The first guard has enough bandwidth to create
two guard sets, which serve two user sets each with three users. The second guard has enough bandwidth to create one guard
set. The third and fourth guards have enough combined bandwidth to create one guard set and similarly the fifth, sixth and
seventh guard create one guard set.
Thus those attacks may be neutralized through setting
appropriate periods before a relay may become a guard.
We consider that end-to-end correlation attacks are pos-
sible if an adversary controls a proportion of the the to-
tal available guard bandwidth and a malicious exit node
(under new Tor specifications a relay can now simulta-
neously be a guard and exit node, though not on the
same circuit). We make the assumption that a compro-
mised guard leads quickly to a full compromise of the
user. Those attacks are the reason to favor stable assign-
ments of users to guards – but we do not aim to protect
against those in any additional way (through padding,
etc).
The proposal for “guard sets” is therefore primarily con-
cerned with guard selection to safeguard against end-to-
end correlation through direct observation, fingerprint-
ing and statistical disclosure attacks.
Guard Sets. To alleviate those problems, the concept
of “guard sets” was proposed [MD13, DKMH14], but
never extensively pursued or developed, due to intrica-
cies of accommodating guards joining and leaving.
The core idea behind “guard sets” is that many users
are assigned the same guard set, out of a small selection.
When it comes to building a Tor circuit clients chose a
first relay out of their assigned guard set – uniformly at
random. Thus users at the same guard set are indistin-
guishable when it comes to fingerprinting, since multi-
ple users will be using the same set of guards. Subject
to carefully crafting rules to assign users to new guard
sets, the population of users served by any guard set are
plentiful, foiling statistical disclosure attacks. Added to
this most guard sets consist of multiple guards, so if one
guard fails users will not need to switch to a new guard
set.
To summarize, “guard sets”, instead of either the three
guard proposals, or the single guard proposals, promise
the following advantages:
– Better protection against the three identified at-
tacks.
– Improved reliability and security when single guards
are temporarily oﬄine.
– The provision of more, and more uniform, band-
width to each client as compared with the single
guard proposal.
The remainder of this paper examines a possible con-
struction for such “guard sets”, dynamic allocation of
users and guards to “guard sets” and compares the se-
curity of the new proposals with previous approaches.
1
A Guard Sets Proposal
Our proposal consists of arranging guards and users in
three layers, each being a bipartite graph:
1. Guards to guard sets.
2. Guard sets to user sets.
3. User sets to users.
We propose algorithms to determine and maintain
guard sets, and show that the security of any guard
selection scheme may be analysed on the basis of the
quadripartite graphs linking guards to guard sets, to
users sets and ultimately to users. An example of such a
1 Unless stated otherwise, data used in experiments use con-
sensuses beginning January 2013 in order to allow for a direct
comparison with the one guard proposal [DKMH14].
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graph is shown in Figure 1: it demonstrates how clients
connect to their guards via user sets – notionally the
set of all users attached to a guard set – and guard sets.
When a client initially joins Tor the assignment algo-
rithm randomly chooses a guard set to use, which is
used by possibly many user sets. The client is then ran-
domly assigned to a user set via means of an identifier
shared among all clients in that set.
Guard sets are initially created by grouping together
guards with similar bandwidth via the current consen-
sus report. Users are split into groups and uniformly
distributed among these guard sets. The main premise
of our proposal is that the relation between guard sets
and user sets is stable, unless there is a need to add in
extra bandwidth or to delete the guard set. This main-
tains a grouping of users with the same guard history
leading to a robust anonymity set, resistant to finger-
printing, and statistical disclosure attacks. Each client
assigned to a guard set then randomly selects a guard
within the set when they wish to build a Tor circuit.
Guards and Guard Sets. Guard sets are initialized
as follows. We split guards into available bandwidth
quanta, the maximum bandwidth a guard can provide
before the threshold for guard sets is reached. A single
guard therefore may split into multiple quanta. We sort
quanta in descending order of their guard bandwidth,
and we then cycle through each quantum appending
them to a set. Once the sum of quantum bandwidths
in the set exceeds a threshold we define it as a guard
set. We then proceed to define another guard set from
the remaining quanta. If available quanta run out be-
fore exceeding the threshold, the quanta are discarded
– and the bandwidth is wasted by not being allocated
to a guard set.
We consistently use a threshold for becoming a guard
set of 40 MB/s, and set a threshold for deleting and
replenishing guard sets at half the creation threshold.
Through experiments we observe this threshold creates
a large number of guard sets and is large enough to
ensure guard sets are deleted infrequently. We do not
claim this threshold to be optimal, and will need to be
adapted according to the Tor network conditions.
The benefits of allocating quanta to guard sets by order
of guard bandwidth are:
1. If a guard has enough bandwidth it can serve mul-
tiple guard sets and therefore serve many user sets.
This helps spread the load of bandwidth efficiently
and facilitates adding new guards.
2. No guard with bandwidth smaller than the thresh-
old can belong to more than one guard set, this
limits the number of guard sets an adversary with
control of a modest fraction of the total guard band-
width can corrupt.
3. Alternative formation strategies see an adversary
with control of a small fraction of total available
bandwidth, through small guards, corrupt a larger
number of guard sets. Assigning quanta to guard
sets from guards with similar bandwidth prevents
smaller adversaries infiltrating a large number of
guard sets.
Client and Guard Set Dynamics. The dynamic na-
ture of Tor requires our proposal to manage the leav-
ing and joining of both guard sets and users in an effi-
cient manner. We do this by considering guard sets and
user sets as nodes on a finite binary tree. This (full) fi-
nite binary tree, also referred to as a finite Cantor tree,
has nodes consisting of all binary sequences up to some
length, as show in Figure 2.
0
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...
00...00 00...01
...
01
...
...
1
10
...
...
11
...
...
11...10 11...11 Ln
...
L2
L1
L0
· · ·
· · ·
Fig. 2. An example of a finite Cantor tree with n layers.
Guard sets sit on some intermediate layer of the tree
covering all leaves (the exact layer determined by how
many guard sets are created upon initialization), with
clients occupying leaves. Each client is assigned a stable
identifier, the binary sequence assigned to that node.
Note that the prefix of the clients identifier is also the
identifier for the guard set to which it belongs.
Guard sets dynamics are based on the following rules:
1. On initialization we assign guard sets random iden-
tifiers of some fixed length.
2. Any path from the root to a leaf must pass through
exactly one node occupied by a guard set.
3. When a new guard set is created we flip a fair coin
at each branch until we get to a guard set node. We
then force this node down a level creating room for
the new guard set on the layer below. By convention
the new guard set branches to the right, or in other
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words, all new guard set identifier sequences will end
with 1.
4. If a guard set is deleted and the sibling node in the
tree is also a guard set we elevate one layer, letting
the sibling guard set occupy the parent node.
5. If a guard set is deleted and the sibling node is not
a guard set we find the lowest layer guard set with a
common ancestor and use the guard set which was
created most recently to replace the deleted guard
set.
Ideally clients should be split equally among all guard
sets, with a uniform occupied / unoccupied leaf spac-
ing. To accomplish this we simply assign each new user
a random identifier which creates an even expected dis-
tribution of users among leaves. Initially this may be
bad for load distribution between guard sets; ideally we
would like to direct more users to a guard set handling
500 users than to a guard set handling 8000, but we
assign users to guard sets in this fashion because (a) in-
sertion attacks become easier when there is a large user
assignment bias to certain guard sets (b) biasing could
create swells of users among areas of leaves, if a guard
set is deleted this would create a large disparity between
user numbers for guard sets at different layers.
The benefits of using this tree structure to manage
guard set and user set assignments can be summarised
as:
– Clients with similar identifier prefixes will have sim-
ilar guard histories, therefore constituting stable
anonymity sets foiling fingerprinting and statistical
attacks.
– It provides an automatic method for guard set dele-
tion and creation, with back-ups selected. Because
guard sets are assigned positions in the tree based
on fair coin flips there is no deterministic way to
forecast where a new guard set will be placed. In
the event that a guard set is deleted, users in the
same user set will use the same back-up guard set.
Unlike other schemes, it is not possible for an ad-
versary to uniquely identify users through back-up
guard histories.
– Compromising a specific target client is made more
difficult due to the random guard set placement in
the tree. Fingerprinting attacks are made more diffi-
cult due to users with similar identifiers have similar
guard histories, while not compromising fair distri-
bution of load on guard sets.
Joining / Leaving Guards. In 2013 total guard band-
width increased from 5283.52 MB/s to 14471.923 MB/s,
illustrating the importance of an effective method for
adding new guards to guard sets. Algorithm 1 outlines
how we introduce guards to existing guard sets that
have dropped below a bandwidth threshold at each con-
sensus. In a nutshell, we detect guard sets with band-
width below a threshold, and attempt to assign to them
available bandwidth quanta from guards with similar
bandwidth. The algorithm previously listed all avail-
able quanta in descending order of bandwidth and cy-
cled through them appending them to guard sets until
a threshold has been reached, and so each guard set will
consist of quanta that have similar bandwidth capacity
to one another. Then for each quantum the algorithm
finds the most suitable guard set - in terms of similar
quanta bandwidths. If enough bandwidth quanta are
found to increase the bandwidth above the threshold
the guard set is considered fine, otherwise it is deleted
and all its quanta made available to build new guard
sets. We consider a guard set broken if it has bandwidth
capacity half of the creation threshold.
Data: consensus, guard sets, fix threshold,
Result: updated guard sets
1 broken guard sets ← guard sets with
bandwidth < fix threshold;
2 fixed guard sets ← guard sets;
3 for broken guard sets do
4 compute candidate guards from available
guards based on bandwidth similarity to
broken guard sets;
5 insert candidate guards in to broken
guard sets;
6 if broken guard set bandwidth > fix
threshold then
7 add to fixed guard sets;
8 else
9 return
10 end
11 fixed guard sets
12 end
Algorithm 1: How to add in guards to depleted
guard sets
Algorithm 2 describes the process of creating, fixing and
deleting guard sets. At each consensus we remove guard
sets that have dropped below a bandwidth threshold,
which we set as half the threshold for guard set cre-
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ation. We redistribute the unused and new guards to
existing guard sets, and create new guard sets with the
remaining unused guards. With every consensus, or at
fixed intervals, current guard sets are fixed or deleted,
and the remaining available quanta are used (in the or-
der of their guards’ bandwidth) to build new guard sets.
Those guard sets are then inserted into the tree to take
charge of a branch of users.
Data: consensus, guard sets, kill threshold,
Result: updated guard sets
1 for every consensus do
2 retrieve guard sets positions in tree;
3 guard sets ← Algorithm 1(guard sets);
4 killed guard sets ← guard sets below kill
threshold;
5 remove killed guard sets from tree;
6 new guard sets ← guard sets created
from leftover quanta;
7 guard sets + = new guard sets;
8 add new guard sets to tree;
9 return guard sets
10 end
Algorithm 2: How to compute guard sets given a
consensus document
Remove Guard Rotation. Johnson et al. [JWJ+13]
showed one of the driving forces behind end-to-end
correlation attacks was guard rotation, where a client
would eventually rotate to a corrupt guard. We therefore
propose to never rotate guards as this would change the
entire guard set graph (displayed in Figure 1) leading to
a faster compromise rate. Therefore guard rotation only
occurs when new guards are added to existing guard sets
to replenish bandwidth that has fallen below a certain
bandwidth (Algorithm 1), or to insert new guard sets
(Algorithm 2) in case a critical mass of bandwidth has
become available.
Analysis
The guard set proposal arranges guards and user in
three bipartite graphs illustrated in Figure 1: The first
layer consists of edges between guards and guard sets.
The second layer maps guard sets to user sets. Initially
this is an injective assignment and as time goes by we
allow the creation of new edges. We only delete an edge
if a user set starts using a new guard set and we re-
quire a user set to have exactly one edge leading to a
guard set at any time. The third layer maps user sets
to users. For each user set this is a many users to one
user set assignment. Note we never move an edge from
an existing user to a new user set, we only delete (in the
case of a user leaving Tor) or add in a new edge (in the
case of a user joining Tor). Clearly moving edges in the
third layer from existing users to user sets other than
the group they were originally assigned to will eventu-
ally create users with unique guard histories.
Security Metric.We consider a Tor user compromised
by an adversary if the user ever uses a guard set contain-
ing a guard under the adversary’s control. Meaning once
a user has been compromised we considering all future
uses of Tor compromised. In terms of the graph repre-
sentation a user is compromised if there exists or has
ever existed an edge path from a corrupt guard to the
user. Under this security metric any path from a guard
to a user is a route for potential compromise, adding a
new edge anywhere can only create the same number
of potential paths or more. We therefore wish to keep
the number of edges in our graph to a minimum while
maintaining the load balance across guard sets.
One guard is optimal in a static environment.
Due to the dynamic nature of Tor we will be forced to
add and remove edges due to bandwidth and user fluc-
tuations. If Tor were a static environment in which we
knew that present and future bandwidth requirements
were equal our security metric implies that the opti-
mal set up of the graph would be an injective assign-
ment in the guard to guard set layer, as it can be rep-
resented with the minimum possible number of edges.
Keeping the requirement of optimal bandwidth load on
guards and allowing for non-uniform sized user sets im-
plies that, in the static case, the one guard proposal
[DKMH14] is optimal. Since if a corrupt guard belongs
to multiple guard sets it compromises them all, it is op-
timal to have each guard be it’s own guard set. This is
true in a static network where all users and guards are
assigned initially to guard sets and user sets and never
join or leave. In a dynamic case, it is no longer true: new
guards are used by fewer users opening the way for sta-
tistical attacks; failing guards force users to fall back on
others, leading to a unique fingerprint per user, and the
need to rotate single failing guards increasing the like-
lihood of direct observation by an adversary. Therefore
it is imperative to measure the quality of anonymity in
a dynamic setting, where guards join and leave.
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Evaluation
Tree algorithm experiment results. Our tree based
algorithm is only applicable if layers on which guard
set nodes sit do not diverge over time, and so each
maintain a similar load. To evaluate the efficacy of the
proposed tree structure scheme we evaluated how map-
pings between guard sets and user sets change under
creations and deletions of guard sets throughout 2013.
Our Python scripts return the difference in layers of
guard sets per day throughout 2013.
Over a year period beginning 1 January 2013 we calcu-
lated, using a daily consensus document, that the lowest
difference in guard set layers is three and the highest
difference in guard set layers is six. This means in the
lowest difference scenario we have at least one guard
set hosting 23 times as many users as at least one other
guard set, and in the highest difference scenario we have
at least one guard set hosting 26 times as many users
as at least one other guard set. The difference in guard
set layers does not grow with time and so there will
not be large differences between number of clients on
guard sets. At any point in time user sets will therefore
be plentiful and there will not be a large disparity of
load on guard sets. Unlike guard sets, in the one guard
scheme there is large disparity of number of users on
large bandwidth guards and new smaller guards.
The introduction of a new guard set splits an existing
user set in half. As a result the size of user sets is variable
and depends on the depth of the corresponding guard
set in the binary tree. This is preferred to user sets of a
fixed size since this strategy can accommodate the dy-
namic nature of Tor. Since we cannot make guarantees
about the number of Tor users at any one time, or make
confident predictions about numbers of future users the
scheme must adapt and enforce the similarity of user
guard histories for any cardinality of global users.
5.1 Anonymity
Security. Elahi et al. [EBA+12] propose a security mea-
sure of “time to first compromise”. Given an initial set
of guards, an adversary adds in one corrupted guard.
Under a no rotation policy in the current three guards
scheme, 10% of clients will use the corrupted guard after
8 months. Under the three guard rotation policy (every
30 - 60 days) 14% of clients will be compromised after
three months.
Under the guard set proposal, we assume that if a guard
is corrupt in a guard set then all clients using that guard
set are compromised. For comparison we ran our ex-
periment with a random single guard chosen as an ad-
versary guard from a random guard set and repeated
100 times. Figure 3 shows the fraction of users compro-
mised. We see that on average we can expect less than
2% of users to be compromised through injecting one
corrupted guard in to a guard set. At worst an adver-
sary will compromise less than 6% of Tor users.
2013-01-01 2013-04-01 2013-06-30 2013-09-28 2013-12-28
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Fr
ac
ti
on
 o
f 
co
m
p
ro
m
is
ed
 u
se
rs
Average fraction of compromised clients
Maximum fraction of compromised clients
Minimum fraction of compromised clients
Fig. 3. Fraction of compromised users given an adversary
controlling one guard. With 1 million users and 100 repeats.
We amend this metric by considering an adversary that
controls a fixed fraction of total guard bandwidth in-
stead of one guard. Initializing guard set creation on
1 January 2013 we chose at random adversary guards
whose bandwidth would sum to 1%, 5% and 10% per-
cent of total guard bandwidth. We then observe the frac-
tion of the user base compromised over the course of one
year. We repeat the experiment one hundred times for
each of the scenarios to also estimate the variability of
anonymity provided.
Experimentally, we observe that the probability of an
adversary guard serving only in a single guard set, un-
til it goes oﬄine, is 0.95. The probability an adversary
guard serves two guard sets, before going oﬄine, is 0.03
and three guard sets is 0.02. We did not observe any
guards observing more than two guard sets.
The average number of controlled adversary guards for
1%, 5% and 10% was calculated to be 4, 14 and 25,
respectively. Assuming an adversary will maximize the
number of guard sets under control, the probability that
the adversary controls the same initial number of guard
sets throughout 2013 is 0.8145, 0.4877 and 0.2773 when
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(a) Adversary controls 1%
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(b) Adversary controls 5%
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(c) Adversary controls 10%
Fig. 4. Fraction of compromised users given an adversary controlling a fixed fraction of guard bandwidth. With 1 million users
and 100 repeats.
in control of 1%, 5% and 10% of bandwidth, respec-
tively. We can therefore be confident that a corrupt
guard will remain in its initial guard sets when an adver-
sary controls 1% of guard bandwidth, and will control
more than its initial guard sets when an adversary con-
trols 10% of guard bandwidth.
Figure 4 shows for each adversary, the compromised
fraction of users at any point in time during 2013 (note
the different y-scales). For each controlling fraction the
highest line shows, after 100 repeats, the maximum ob-
served fraction of the Tor user base that is compromised.
The quantized structure of lines is due to whole user
sets being served by corrupt guard sets as adversary
guards’ assignments change. We observe the final frac-
tion of compromised users at the end of the year is sta-
ble throughout the year, after an initial period of 2 to
3 months.
The average rate of compromise after a year for the 1%,
5% and 10% of the bandwidth is 9.83%, 21.42%, 32.69%
of users respectively. However, those rates of compro-
mise are contingent on the specific guards being cor-
rupt and their movements across guard sets. Thus for
1%, 5% and 10% corrupt bandwidth we observe scenar-
ios with rates of compromise as high as 21.31%, 35.91%
and 46.80%, respectively.
We note the rate of compromise increases sharply in
the first quarter of the 2013 year. Figure 5 explains the
proliferation in number of compromised users at the be-
ginning of year.
We see a dramatic decrease in the number of guard sets
in March 2013, leading to a larger fraction of clients who
use each guard set compared to previous months. We see
a small increment in user compromise in September as
the number of guard sets once again decreases. By this
time there are a large number of established guard sets
in the Tor network. Due to the diversity in guard sets,
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Fig. 5. Number of guard sets.
the fraction of users using each guard set is less than
in the first few months of the year. We hypothesize this
increment is not as drastic as in previous months due
to the large number of guard sets.
By March a large proportion of adversary guards will
still be online and so the fraction of users it can com-
promise will increase. Figure 5 shows that in following
months the number of guard sets increase, thereby de-
creasing the fraction of users using each guard set, and
adversary guards will also start to go oﬄine. Hence we
see a gradual decrease in the rate at which users are
compromised.
Our metric assumes that once a user has been com-
promised we may consider future uses of Tor compro-
mised. We have demonstrated that in the examined pe-
riod guard and user sets are relatively stable, and that
the number of daily deleted guard sets is a small frac-
tion of the number of total guard sets. Guards with high
likelihood, stay within the guard set they were origi-
nally assigned to. Our policy of not purposefully rotat-
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ing guards limits the strategy an adversary controlling a
small fraction of bandwidth can employ to corrupt Tor
users. We expect an adversary to maximize the amount
of guard sets under initial control. Our scheme therefore
offer Tor clients greater anonymity than current schemes
providing an adversary does not control a large fraction
of guard bandwidth.
Susceptibility to Fingerprint Attacks. In the one
guard proposal clients using new low bandwidth guards
have a guard that is almost unique to them (in the three
guard proposal things are much worse, virtually all users
have a unique set of three guards). As of April 2014,
Tor metrics estimates there to be 2.75 million global
users of Tor, and the most likely set of three guards is
1.7× 10−6 [DKMH14]. Therefore we can expect this set
of guards to have 4.7 users, implying most users guards
will uniquely identify them. Furthermore, every user has
a guard fall back list, and using those leads to a unique
guard history and fingerprint for the user.
Our proposal of keeping users in a group removes the
chance that an attacker could identify a client based on
the guards they used at different periods of time. Ini-
tialising on 1 January 2013 produces 108 guard sets,
given 2.75 million users this creates 108 user sets of
size 25463. Our experiment on tree dynamics showed
that guard sets won’t lie deeper than four or five lay-
ers from initialisation. So at worst there may exist some
user sets of size 795, meaning there will always be at
least 795 clients with the same guard history. All user
sets will have sibling user sets that have the same guard
histories prior to the last tree structure change that ef-
fected them, creating a hierarchy of user sets with simi-
lar guard histories. Guard sets provide a pool of guards
to use and so provide resistance against unique guard
histories through guard failure.
Therefore the guard sets scheme performs better than
current schemes at protecting clients from being iden-
tified via their guard history, and provides a large
anonymity set for all users to avoid disclosure attacks.
5.2 Diversity and Performance
In both the three and new one guard schemes guards are
heavily under-utilized. This is due to bandwidth weights
allocating a large fraction of bandwidth for use as a
guard but few clients initially using newer guards. In
the guard set design new guards are incorporated into
an existing or new guard set and immediately used by
a large number of users. Figure 6 shows the amount of
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Fig. 7. Number of guard sets for varying cutoffs
guard bandwidth that will left over2 . As expected there
is never more spare bandwidth than the threshold used
to make guard sets, otherwise a new guard set would be
created.
At the beginning of 2013 spare bandwidth accounts for
0.46% percent of the total guard bandwidth, and is as
low as 0.031% by the end of the year. Since guards may
also serve as middle and exit relays, this wastage is low
enough to be of no concern. Due to the prioritization
of bandwidth quanta from larger guards in construct-
ing guard sets, spare bandwidth is also biased towards
smaller bandwidth relays, which do not make a large
contribution to total bandwidth on the network.
2 We redistribute available guards to new and existing guard
sets at the end of each day instead of at each new consensus
document (hourly).
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Fig. 8. CDF plots for guards and guard sets
Figure 7 shows the number of guard sets that would
be created for various thresholds (guard and guard set
thresholds). We observe that after a cutoff of around 25
MB/s the number of guard sets (and hence the spread of
load) is roughly the same for guards pruned at different
values. Indicating that raising the limit for becoming
a guard has little impact on the number of guard sets
created.
Figure 8a shows the fraction of clients using guards of
various bandwidths (i.e. performance a client can expect
on Tor) against both the one and three guard selection
scheme. It was created upon initialisation of guard sets
at which point all guard sets have an equal load of users.
As we can see, 80% of clients have the same performance
in the guard set and one guard proposal. The guard
set solution is worse for a small fraction of clients; ap-
proximately 90% of clients have performance less than
75 MB/s whereas in the one guard proposal 85% of
clients have performance less than 75 MB/s. Note that
both proposals are worse than the three guards elec-
tion scheme; only 10%, 20% of clients have better per-
formance under the guard set proposal and one guard
proposal, respectively. Upon initialisation our proposal
performs slightly worse than the one guard proposal.
Figure 8b shows we can expect fluctuations in guard set
selection statistics as guard sets move up and down the
tree, but since guard sets never deviate from one another
by more than a few layers these fluctuations will be
small and temporary. Upon initialisation 80% of clients
use guard sets with bandwidth 50 MB/s or less, and
100% of clients use guard sets with bandwidth 75 MB/s
or less. At any time throughout the year 80% of clients
use guard sets with bandwidth 75 MB/s or less, and 95%
of clients will use guard sets with bandwidth 100 MB/s
or less. Figure 8b implies that our guard set scheme is
stable and does not create swells of users that can expect
a degradation in performance as time progresses.
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Fig. 9. Median bandwidth per guard set
Figures 8 and 9 imply that any Tor user can expect
the same level of performance as any other Tor user.
There is no hierarchy of performance level depending
on which guard a client begins to use as there are with
other schemes.
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Fig. 10. Guard bandwidth and availability statistics
Figure 9 shows the median bandwidth per guard set
throughout 2013. As expected nearly all guard sets
throughout this period are between 40 and 50 MB/s.
Cross referencing with Figure 11, we see that as the
total guard bandwidth decreases during March so does
the median bandwidth per guard set. The fluctuations
in median bandwidth per guard set are directly mirrored
by the fluctuations in total guard set bandwidth.
Ideally we would like to never change the initial edge
structure between guards and guard sets leading to
guard rotation and increasing the rate of compromise of
clients [JWJ+13]. So the question becomes, how often
do we need to change the edge structure between guards
and guard sets? Figure 10a shows what would happen
to our total guard bandwidth if we decided to only use
the guards from the initial creation and not use any new
eligible guard relays. After 3 months the total available
guard bandwidth has increased by 10% but only 68% of
the initial guard bandwidth is still available. The trend
continues: after 10 months the total guard bandwidth
increases by over 40% but only 40% of the initial guard
bandwidth is still available.
We conclude it is necessary for guards to be added in to
guard sets to replace bandwidth lost over time. This is
again highlighted in Figure 10b which shows the proba-
bility that a guard selected at the creation of guard sets
is still available over a period of 10 months (for various
percentiles). We see that even for Tor guards with band-
width in the top 10% there is less than a 40% chance
they are still available after 10 months
Although there is a need to replace dropped guards in
guard sets regularly, permanent deletion of guard sets is
an infrequent event for a guard set threshold of 40MB/s.
Figure 5 and appendix B shows the daily number of to-
tal, deleted and added guard sets throughout 2013. The
number of daily new and deleted guard sets remains
small despite the number of total guard sets increasing.
By the end of 2013 we have over double the initial num-
ber of guard sets. Experimentally we calculated that at
40 MB/s threshold roughly < 10% of guard sets will be
deleted at the end of every day, with this dropping to <
3% near the end of 2013. We also found that with a 50
MB/s threshold the number of guard sets that warrant
deletion at the end of each day is much higher than at
40 MB/s. This provided experimental support for our
threshold. If we were to set a low threshold we create
many guard sets, which limits the number of guard sets
an adversary can corrupt, but we can expect a higher
rate of churn contributing to an increase in compromise
rate and possibly allowing for attacks via strategic injec-
tions of corrupt guards to guard sets. A higher thresh-
old will provide faster guard sets but will create fewer
in number, making it easier for an adversary to control
a larger fraction of the total number of guard sets.
As shown by Figures 5 and 11, as total guard set band-
width increases so does the number of guard sets, mak-
ing it increasingly difficult to predict which back up
guard sets a particular guard set may use. This increase
in diversity of guard sets will simultaneously decrease
the compromise rate of clients while increasing expected
performance.
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Fig. 11. Total guard set bandwidth
Guard Set Creation & Deletion due to Tempo-
rary Bandwidth Changes. To understand the dy-
namics and stability of guard sets we must know how
often guards go oﬄine temporarily and reappear online.
Consensuses are issued every hour so it may be that
guard sets are affected by higher frequency guard churn
that is not being accurately captured. If guards were
reported as online and oﬄine frequently we may have
to swap guards in and out of guard sets regularly which
would increase the rate of compromise. Using a consen-
sus from 25/11/143 we recorded how many guards are
online and oﬄine every 10 minutes over a 24 hour pe-
riod. Every 10 minutes we sent an ICMP echo request
to all guards and for all guards that timed out we sent
a TCP scan to check if the relay was down or if they
were not accepting echo requests.
Figure 12 shows the total number of relays that were
reported as down every 10 minutes over the 24 hour
period. The number of guards that are down during this
period is small and remains nearly constant. During this
period the lowest number of reported online guards was
1509 out of 1524, and the highest was 1515. Hence we
can conclude that the ratio of oﬄine to online guards
remains stable.
Figure 13 shows the number of relays that were reported
as oﬄine. Over 70 relays out of 1524 we were reported
as oﬄine once over the 24 hour period. Following this
3 Using an older consensus would result in the identification of
many guards being oﬄine for the entire request period due to
them having dropped out of the network before the request was
started.
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each request. The request was made every 10 minutes over a
24 hour period. Using the 2014-10-25-11-00-00-consensus, the
requests were made on 2014-10-25/26 from 11pm - 11pm.
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Fig. 13. Number of times requests have timed out over 24
hour period.
the number of relays reported as oﬄine for more than
one request drops off; the number of relays reported as
being oﬄine for two requests (out of 145 requests) was
below 20. The number of relays being seen as oﬄine for
more requests steadily decreases until 145 where there
is a sharp increase due to some guards being oﬄine for
the entire 24 hour period. This implies that time outs
are commonly due to an isolated incident or relays per-
manently going oﬄine, with almost no middle ground.
Figure 14 shows the number of times a guard will be
reported as online / oﬄine given that it has been seen
oﬄine for x number of previous requests. We see that
there is a 1.88% chance of a guard being reported as on-
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line once it has been reported as oﬄine for two requests.
As expected the probability of a guard coming back on-
line decreases the longer it is reported oﬄine. This shows
that while the number of guards reported oﬄine is rel-
atively small, for the unfortunate clients using a guard
that drops oﬄine there is little chance the guard will
come back online. In the one guard proposal this leads
to a possible fingerprinting attack, due to clients re-
peatedly using back-up guards, which eventually leads
to unique guard histories for clients. In our proposal
this is not a problem because nearly all clients will have
multiple guards to choose from, and in the event that a
guard set is deleted, users in the same user set will use
the same back-up guard set.
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Fig. 14. This shows the number of times a relay may be seen
oﬄine and then in the following request is see oﬄine again
or is seen back online. For example we see there is a 14.4%
chance your relay will be back online after timing out of one
request, whereas there are no reported instances of a relay
being down for six consecutive ping request and then coming
back online.
Figure 15 shows the number of guard sets that dropped
below various thresholds during a 24 hour period. We
see that nearly all guard sets keep all their bandwidth,
and there is very little churn. Only a few times does
a guard set drop to 0 MB/s at which point we would
move the user set to a back up guard set. At creation
there were 468 guard sets created indicating guard set
deletion due to bandwidth changes over short periods
of time will happen infrequently.
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Fig. 15. Number of guard sets below bandwidth thresholds
over a 24 hour period. Each request was made to over 1500
guard relays, creating 468 guard sets.
Future Work & Conclusion
This is a first study of how guard sets could work,
and a number of practicalities need to be fleshed out
before realistically considering deployment, which are
beyond the scope of this work. Further security and
performance analysis may lead to fundamentally differ-
ent algorithms, and so we deliberately did not study in
depth any specific route to deployment in this work.
More specifically, in our security analysis we considered
only adversaries at Tor relays, ignoring the network
between them. This has been an active area of research
[FD04, MZ07, ES09, JWJ+13, WTBS13]; before deploy-
ment IX and AS-level adversaries should be considered.
Seemingly, guard sets may suffer more than other guard
designs; since guard sets are formed based entirely on
bandwidth criteria it is more likely that guard sets with
a larger number of guards, and so compromised of re-
lays from a wide range of Autonomous Systems, would
be more more vulnerable to an AS-level adversary. We
note that Tor attempts to mitigate this to some extent;
in a circuit relays need to be from different /16 subnets,
and families of relays from the same operator can’t be
used in the same circuit.
Other security concerns for which we provide arguments
against but would require formal proofs before deploy-
ment include:
1. Adversarial manipulation of the algorithm.
Specifically, the optimal strategy an adversary will
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use to corrupt guard sets. We show in section 5.1
the scheme provides strong security regardless of
whether an adversary maximizes the number of con-
trolled guard sets.
2. DoS attacks on guard sets - targetting spe-
cific clients.
The tree structure attempts to mitigate these at-
tacks via the random placement of new guard sets
and making it difficult to predict the placement of
back-up guard sets (section 3). These attacks are
hard to totally prevent but expect the scheme to
perform at least equally as well as the current guard
schemes.
We did not attempt to investigate how guard sets
would cope under DoS attacks such as the Sniper
Attack [JTJS14], where the intent is to simply ob-
serve more clients. We expect that guard sets may
suffer more than other entry schemes if the attack
is to maximize the number clients observed by the
adversary.
3. Resistance to fingerprinting attacks.
We currently do not formally prove resistance to
fingerprinting attacks, but it would be possible to
make an indistinguishability argument based on ID
prefixes being clients’ only used state and those be-
ing shared within an anonymity set.
A key question remains open: who manages the assign-
ment of guards into guard sets? Answering this fully
could easily be the subject of a separate work. We how-
ever note that Tor maintains a consensus of the set of all
relays, and our algorithm can be formulated to be de-
terministic on the basis of this consensus document and
a source of public but unpredictable randomness. Such
randomness may be produced through a distributed fair
coin flipping protocol [MNS09] or through centralized
mechanisms such as the NIST Beacon [fST15]. Thus
given a sequence of consensus sets and a public but un-
predictable random seed, any client may re-execute the
algorithm that assigns guards to guard sets. However,
due to the unpredictability of the seed an adversary
may not game their position within guard sets. Thus,
authorities only need to compute a consensus as they
currently do, and execute the publicly verifiable assign-
ment for each epoch. Clients may verify this assignment,
but can also use it without verifying it - considering that
a consensus and assignments signed by all authorities is
trustworthy.
We have outlined the first steps to a new entry guard
scheme for the Tor network. The guard set proposal
addresses many of the security concerns that both the
three and one guard scheme are susceptible to while
performing equally as well. The resulting guard sets are:
Plentiful. The number of guard sets provide enough
diversity to prevent compromise of a large fraction
of the Tor user base.
Stable. Due to relay stability and the way we created
guard sets, guard set deletion is a rare occurrence.
The low natural rotation of guards through guard
sets limits the potential for direct observation of
clients. The shared history, even under failure, elim-
inates fingerprinting attacks.
Fair. Most guard sets have equal bandwidth capacity.
Clients can expect the same performance no matter
their choice of guard set.
Large. All guard sets serve roughly equal sized user
sets, and a large number of users at any time. This
prevents statistical attacks on the basis of discover-
ing a user’s guards.
Guard sets allocate traffic on the Tor network so each
relay is used efficiently. At any scale of network band-
width capacity our proposal will offer every client the
same level of performance as any other client. As net-
work bandwidth increases, the number and stability of
guard sets increase thereby decreasing the rate at which
an adversary can compromise Tor users.
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Guard set Layer Differences
The daily difference in tree layers for guard sets in 2013:
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Fig. 16. Number of guard sets created and deleted.
